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Iam become death, the destroyer of worlds.
Scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer quoting
from the Hindu text, the Baghavid-Gita,
at the first atom bomb test in from the
Hindu text, the 1945.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Like the Hindu deity Shiva, a nuclear weapon has inherent duality: it
can be a "destroyer," as was demonstrated at the end of World War II, or a
"creator," as has been proven thereafter.2 Specifically, since the advent of
these weapons in 1945, an era has been produced that is free of the kind of
savage global conflicts that twice visited the world this century - conflicts
whose monstrous cost totaled more than 87 million lives.
Despite the relative peace of the nuclear-weapons' age, General George
Lee Butler, the former Commander in Chief (CINCSTRAT) of United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), declared in a December 1996
interview with the Washington Post that nuclear weapons were "morally
indefensible."4 Although General Butler later incongruously maintained that
he was not calling for immediate, unilateral nuclear disarmament,' his
* Colonel Dunlap (B.A. St. Joseph's University; J.D. Villanova University) is the Staff Judge
Advocate, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. He is a member of the
Pennsylvania State Bar.
I As quoted in THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 459 (Lewis D.
Eigen and Jonathan P. Siegel, Eds. 1993).
2 For a discussion of the duality of Shiva as a "destroyer" and "creator" see THE WORLD'S
GREAT RELIGIONS 16 (Sam Welles et al., eds., 1957).
1 Military historian Martin Van Creveld observes that, ironically, "in every region where
[nuclear weapons] have been introduced, large-scale, interstate war has as good as
disappeared." Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War II, in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF MODERN WAR 304 (Charles Townsend, ed., 1997) (emphasis in original).
I General Butler stated that "Nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive,
militarily inefficient, and morally indefensible." See R. Jeffrey Smith, Retired Nuclear
WarriorSounds Alarm on Weapons, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 4, 1996, at Al.
' George Lee Butler, The General'sBombshell, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 12, 1997, at
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assertion, nevertheless, should be of great concern not only to judge advocates
practicing operations law, but indeed to all members of the armed forces.
General Butler's allegation of moral indefensibility, if unanswered, has
the dangerous potential to undermine America's nuclear deterrent. While
persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice are obliged to obey
lawful orders even if they conflict with their individual consciences,6 Butler's
assertion questions the very legality of such orders.
Even more troubling, his manifesto assaults the ethos of our armed
forces - an ethos upon which America's future warfighting success depends.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicts in Joint Vision 2010 that
"success [in future conflicts] will depend... upon the.., moral strengths of the
individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine .... We will build upon the
enduring foundation of... core values and high ethical standards." 7
For a variety of reasons, nuclear weapons already present profound
moral issues with the potential to impact military operations.8 Obviously,
when a military leader of General Butler's stature makes such a claim that he
did, the situation becomes more even more exacerbated and conceivably
divisive. In its worst extrapolation, moral uncertainty is introduced into the
minds of thousands of conscientious and honorable men and women upon
whom America's nuclear deterrent relies - uncertainty that could manifest
itself at the worst possible time for the Nation.9
Cl.
6 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES,

ch. IV, para. 14c(2)(a)(iii) (1995) states

that "dictates of a person's conscience, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or
excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful order."
7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOINT VISION 2010 28, 34 (1996).
8 For example, in 1983, U.S. Catholic Bishops issued a letter entitled The Challenge ofPeace:
God's Promise and Our Response which discussed nuclear war and nuclear deterrence
reprintedin WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 463 (Malham M. Waikin, ed.
1983). Although the bishops accept the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons for
deterrence as an interim step towards complete disarmament, and seem to leave open the
possibility that an extremely limited, other-than-first-use employment against purely military
targets may be moral, they nevertheless say that "there must be no misunderstanding of our
profound skepticism about the moral acceptability of any use of nuclear weapons." Id., at 482.
For a critique of the Bishops' letter see John W. Coffey, The American Bishops on War and
Peace in PARAMETERS OF MILITARY ETHICS (Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., 1989), at 28.
' To illustrate a circumstance where a moral conundrum might emerge, one analyst of the
Bishops' letter notes that approximately thirty percent of the armed forces are comprised of
Catholics, and further observes:
Individual soldiers who are Roman Catholic are confronted with a
serious choice. If they are going to follow the Bishops' teaching, they
will be compelled to disobey an order to fire a countervalue nuclear
weapon. An individual may have no crisis of conscience during time of
peace. If,however, he is serving in a position in which he could be
ordered to launch a countervalue, how would he respond if the order
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What might such uncertainty mean for deterrence? The experts tell us
that "[t]o deter a nuclear attack, retaliation must be perceived as likely ....
If an enemy perceives that our forces"1 are too psychologically encumbered by
the kind of moral dilemma General Butler's pronouncement encourages to
fully respond to an attack, then the adversary may discern an advantage in
making one.
Consequently, this article has three purposes: first, it intends to counter
General Butler's claim of moral indefensibility by explaining the legal and
ethical norms within which U.S. nuclear forces operate. Second, it aims to
briefly introduce the practitioner to some of the major legal issues associated
with nuclear weapons, as well as to the procedures by which legal advice is
incorporated into the planning process. Third, it will discuss practical lessons
learned from GLOBAL GUARDIAN 97, America's premier strategic nuclear
exercise. This article will conclude by contending that a robust mechanism is
in place to ensure that the moral and ethical standards of the rule of law are
fully inculcated into America's nuclear deterrent. 2

II. LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
As many practitioners know, the United States has always insisted that
nuclear weapons are not inherently unlawful instrumentalities of armed
conflict. 3 From time to time, however, elements of the international
community have questioned this premise. For example, the United Nations
were issued? Until the time arrives,the answer to the question cannot be
known. By the same token no Roman Catholic can morally issue an order
to launch countervalue nuclear weapons. The same choices, tensions,
and questions apply to those issuing the orders.
Captain Mary E. McGrath, Nuclear Weapons: A Crisis of Conscience, 107 MIL. L. REV. 191,
239 (1985) (emphasis'added).
10 Edward Luttwak and Stuart L. Koehl, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 166 (1991).
1 In addition to adverse effects on military forces, public support for deterrence can also be
eroded if there is a perception that it is based on an immoral and unlawful means. Compare
W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, THE LAWS OF WAR xxiv (1994):
In modem popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a
substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even
reverse itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if
people believe that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or
iniquitous way.
Id.
12 An established goal and objective of USSTRATCOM is to "[e]mphasize the role of law as a
guiding force in our national security strategy." USSTRATCOM Goals and Objectives, para.
B.4 (1996) (on file with the author).
"3 See e.g., U.S. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, InternationalLaw - The Conduct of
Armed Conflict andAir Operations,para. 6-5 (1976).
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General Assembly has passed a number of non-binding resolutions that have
condemned nuclear weapons."
Importantly, the International Court of Justice (1CJ), the judicial arm of
the United Nations, issued an advisory opinion in 1996 that addressed the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 5 While the ICJ decision does
not create a binding precedent in the same sense as a U.S. appellate court,16 it is
influential in the court of world opinion and, indeed, may be accepted by a
considerable
number of countries as an expression of customary international
17
law.
The ICJ determined that no existing rule of international law prohibits
the use of nuclear weapons in conflict.1 Although it concluded that their
employment would "generally be contrary to rules of international law
applicable to armed conflict," the court nevertheless found it could not say that
such use was necessarily illegal "in self-defense in which the, very survival of a
State would be at stake."19 Of interest to the practitioner is the court's use of
the phrase "a State" instead of "the State." This suggests that the use of
nuclear weapons is not limited to the survival of the nuclear-weapons state
itself, but that they also could be employed in appropriate circumstances in the
collective self-defense of an non-nuclear ally.2 °
More problematic is determining exactly what circumstances and at
what point along the continuum of conflict does the "survival" of a state
become at stake. 1 Moreover, what precisely does "survival" of a state mean?
Though beyond the scope of this article, one might fairly conclude that, given
the UN Charter's emphasis on self-determination and support for the rule of
law, "survival" could reasonably be interpreted broadly enough to include
freedom from the intense coercion arising from any use of weapons of mass
14

See e.g.,, Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear

Weapons, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res. 1653 (XVI), Nov. 24, 1961; NonUse of Force in InternationalRelations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons, UNGA Res. 2936, Nov. 29, 1973; and Convention on the Prohibitionof the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, UNGA Res. 47/53C (1992).
" Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, General List No. 95 (Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice, July 8, 1996) [hereinafter ICJ op.]. For an excellent
analysis of the case see Michael N. Schmitt, The InternationalCourt of Justice and the Use of
Nuclear Weapons (1997) (draft, forthcoming in the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Fall
1997).
16 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 903 cmt. H,
illus. 12 (advisory opinions are binding only when the parties agree that they will be decisive).
" For a discussion of "customary international law" see Reisman and Antoniou, supra note
12, at xix-xxi.
18 ICJ op., supra note 15, at para. 105(2)B (emphasis added).
'9 Id. atpara. 105(2)E.
20 See The International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, U.S., Air Force THE
REPORTER, September 1996, at 21-22.
21 Schmitt, supra note 15, at 42-43.
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destruction or from an overwhelming conventional threat. Therefore, the ICJ's
decision is not necessarily at odds with U.S. doctrine.'
The most important implication of the ICJ case for U.S. legal advisors
and planners is its reflection of the international community's widely differing
views as to the propriety of nuclear weapons. Some allies or coalition partners
in a given campaign might, for example, decline to support a nuclear mission
under some or any circumstances despite the fact that they are full, cooperative
partners in conventional operations.'
I. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (LOAC)
However ambiguous the ICJ was in other areas, there was no
equivocation on its conclusion that any use of nuclear weapons must conform
to applicable requirements of international law, and these would include the
LOAC concepts of discrimination, military necessity, and proportionality. 24
This presents little difficulty for American planners as the United States has
"long taken the position that various principles of the international law of
armed conflict would apply to the use of nuclear weapons as well as other
means and methods of warfare."'
Still, any discussion of nuclear weapons is complicated by the
widespread but mistaken belief that their destructive potential makes it
impossible to apply LOAC principles. Actually, modem technologies and
methodologies afford planners a number of tools helpful to LOAC
compliance.26 For example, Joint Publication 3-12.1, Doctrine for Joint

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12, Doctrinefor Joint Nuclear
Operations, December 1995, at [hereinafter cited as Joint Pub 3-12] states that "the
fundamental purpose of US nuclear forces is to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), particularly nuclear weapons, and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an
overwhelming conventional threat." Id. at v.
' See Colonel C. Robert Kehler, Nuclear Armed Adversaries and the Joint Commander,
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Winter 1996, at 7, 9.
' ICJ op. supra note 15, at para. 105(2)D. See also Written Statement of the Government of
the United States of America before the International Court of Justice, June 14, 1994 (Request
by the World Health Organization for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of the Legality
Under International Law of the Use of Nuclear Weapons by a State in War or Other Armed
Conflict), at 26-31) (discussing the application of various LOAC principles to nuclear
operations) [hereinafter U.S. ICJ strut.]
' U.S. ICJ strut. supra note 24, at 26. Accord L.C. Green, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 124-126 (1993). For an overview of nuclear weapons in the context of
legal and policy issues see Ronald F. Lehman II, Nuclear Weapons: Deployment, Targeting
andDeterrencein NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (John Norton Moore et al. Eds., 1990) at 485.
26 George Bunn, the former general Counsel for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
argues that until the early 1970s, the U.S. lacked the technology to "permit significant
discrimination between population and other targets in or near cities." See George Bunn, US
Law ofNuclear Weapons,_NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Fall 1984, at 58-59.
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Theater Nuclear Operations27 notes that by reducing weapon yield, improving
accuracy through delivery system selection, employing multiple small weapons
(as opposed to a single, large device), adjusting the height of burst, and
offsetting the desired ground zero, collateral damage can be minimized
consistent with military objectives. 28 A working knowledge of these planning
options, along with a general understanding of nuclear weapons themselves,29
is extremely helpful to judge advocates tasked to provide LOAC advice for
these highly-complex operations.
Additionally, USSTRATCOM's Strategic War Planning System
(SWPS) can, among other things, model the probability of arrival, probability
of damage, and overall damage expectancy of a given weapon delivered on a
selected target by a designated platform. Of particular importance to
practitioners, the system can also project expected numbers of casualties,
fatalities, and population-at-risk based on information drawn from the Joint
Resource Assessment Data Base. 30 However, SWPS operates within certain
parameters and, consequently, the legal advisor must understand its limitations
and evaluate the data accordingly. Modeling and decision support systems do
not - and must not - supplant the commander's intuition in the execution of the
warfighting art. It is vital that the practitioner avoid an overly mechanistic
application of computer modeling data; it must not become a substitute for a
holistic LOAC analysis. "'
Despite such efforts it is nevertheless true that attacks on certain targets
would likely result in sizable civilian casualties. It should be recalled,
however, that LOAC places responsibilities for minimizing civilian casualties
not just on the attacker, but on' the defender as well. That responsibility
extends to exercising "care to separate individual civilians and the civilian
'
population as such from the vicinity of military objectives."32
Where the
defender fails to exercise such care, the primary culpability for collateral
civilian casualties lies with him, so long as the attacker continues to work to
27

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12.1, Doctrinefor Joint Theater

Nuclear Operations,9 February 1996, [hereinafter Joint Pub 3-12.1].
28 Id., at 111-2 and 111-3.
29 For a very brief explanation of nuclear weapons technology see Luttwak and Koehl, supra
note 10.
" These terms have specific definitions. For example, "casualties" are defined as the
"estimated number of people who die or receive injuries that require medical treatment due to

short term effects (6 months) of nuclear detonations." "Population at Risk" is defined as the
"total civilian population in danger of dying, independent of shelter, from short term (6
months) effects of nuclear detonations." See Memorandum, Acronyms/Definitions Used in
SIOP Analysis(U), USSTRATCOM Plans and Policy Directorate, Force Assessment Branch
(April 1997) (on file with author).
3 Compare Glenn E. James, CHAOS THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS
57-95 (Newport Paper No. 10, Naval War College, 1996) (discussing the limitations of
computer modeling).
32 W. Hays Parks, Air War andthe Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 168 (1990).
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minimize civilian casualties as much as is practicable under the circumstances.
Legal advisors should likewise be aware that while the U.S. does not
target populations per se,33 it reserves the right to do so under the limited
circumstance of belligerent reprisal.34 The U.S. (along with other declared
nuclear powers) insists that Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions35 does not
apply to nuclear weapons. 6 Hence, prohibitions contained in Protocol I
forbidding reprisals against civilians are not, in the U.S. view, applicable to
nuclear operations. 7 Parenthetically, James W. Child observes in Nuclear
War: The Moral Dimension that "people have a duty to restrain their
government from committing nuclear aggression and if they fail in that duty,
'
their absolute immunity as noncombatants is undermined."38
Finally, legal advisors must understand the special political and
psychological dimensions of nuclear weapons. Although using nuclear - or
any other - weapons merely to terrorize noncombatant civilians is contrary to
international law, affecting the mental state of an adversary, degrading his
morale, and eroding his will to continue the conflict, can all constitute
legitimate military objectives. 9 The difficulty, as Geoffrey Best notes, is reliably
quantifying such amorphous and often quite culturally-specific psychological
concepts to the point where one could reasonably conclude before the attack that
" For a historical overview of U.S. doctrine concerning population targeting, see Jeffrey
Richelson, Population Targeting and US. Strategic Doctrine, in STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
TARGETING (Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., 1986) 234-249.
"' See U.S. ICJ Stint,supra note 24, at 26, 31. "For the purpose of the law of armed conflict,
reprisals are retaliation in the form of conduct that would otherwise be unlawful, resorted to by
one belligerent in response to violations of the law of war by another belligerent." Id., at 31.
Moreover, "[u]nder the customary law of armed conflict, reprisals may only be taken for the
purpose of enforcing future compliance with [the] law, and must comply with certain rules
limiting scope and effect" Id., citing U.S. Army, Field Manual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare
(1956), at 177.
" Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 16
I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
16 U.S. ICJ stint. supra note 24, at 28-29. The U.S. reiterated and detailed this position in a
later submission to the ICJ. See Written Comments of the Government of the United States of
America on the Submissions of Other States before the International Court of Justice, June 20,
1995 (Request by the World Health Organization for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of
the Legality Under International Law of the Use of Nuclear Weapons by a State in War or
Other Armed Conflict) at 23-30.
3"Id. at 31. See generally, Matt C.C. Bristol I, The Laws of War and Belligerent Reprisals
Against
Enemy Civilian Populations,21 A.F. L. REV. 397 (1979).
38 James
W. Child, NUCLEAR WAR: THE MORAL DIMENsION 171-172 (1986).
"9See U.S. Navy, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook of the Law of Naval
Operations, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 9 (Rev.A) (1989) para. 8.5.1.2 (discussing the
prohibition on the bombardment for the sole purpose of terrorizing civilians) and Parks, supra
note 32, at 142 (discussing the general proposition of psychological purposes as military
objectives).
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a "definite military advantage" would be achieved. 40
To avoid such dilemmas, Joint Pub 3-12.1 considers, for example,
affecting an adversary's "[p]erception of US will and resolve" as an employment
(as opposed to targeting) consideration. 1 In other words, under U.S. doctrine a
particular target must first be justified in orthodox military terms independent of
the psychological or political 'message' the use of nuclear weapons might
produce.
IV. SPECIAL ISSUES
The exceptional nature of nuclear weapons raises special issues of
international law that are beyond the usual LOAC considerations. These
include:
A. Arms Control and Related Agreements.
A myriad of international agreements exist which in some way touch
upon nuclear weapons.42 In particular, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I)4' sets specified limits on the kinds of nuclear strategic systems the
U.S. may possess. 44 Other agreements place restrictions as well. The Outer
Space Treaty,45 for example, forbids the orbiting or installation (but not transit)
of nuclear weapons in space. Similarly, a growing number of terrestrial
nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) agreements have been concluded.46

See Geoffrey Best, LAW AND WAR SINCE 1945 274-275 (1994).
41 Joint Pub 3-12.1, supranote 27, at 111-7.
40

42

For a listing of some of these agreements see Joint Pub 3-12 supra note 22 at Appendix A.

4 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic and Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991 reprintedin
U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch Supplement (1991).
4 See generally Stewart M. Powell, Nuclear Arms Reductions Roll On, AIR FORCE
MAGAZINE, December 1996, at 57.
" Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (The Outer Space Treaty), 18 U.S.T
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 27 January 1967. See also Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and
inthe Subsoil Thereof, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, Feb. 11, 1971.
46 See e.g., Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Feb. 14, 1967, 22
U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 762; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga),
Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442 (1985), and its Protocols; and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone (Pelindaba Text), May, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698 (1996). See generally, Mark E. Rosen,
Nuclear-Weapons-FreeZones, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Autumn 1996, at 44.
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The U.S. is a party to NWFZ agreements which exist for Antarctica,
Latin America, Africa, the South Pacific, and the sea-bed. 47 Usually the U.S.
and other nuclear weapons states commit "not to test nuclear weapons inside
the zone, not to use or threaten to use the weapons against any treaty or
protocol party inside its territory or territorial sea, and not to station, develop,
or manufacture nuclear weapons inside the zone."4'8 The U.S., however,
considers that none of these agreements compromise freedom of navigation,
overflight, and similar rights which otherwise exist.49 Nevertheless, judge
advocates should be aware that some nations have a different interpretation in
this regard."0
As noted above with regard to NWFZ agreements, the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),s1 which was extended for an indefinite period
in 1995, presents the rather unique issue of "negative security assurances."
Separate from the text of the treaty itself, the U.S. and other nuclear weapons
states foreswore - subject to certain conditions - the use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear treaty parties. Specifically, the U.S. version of the
declaration provided in connection with the NPT extension states:
The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against
any non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of invasion or any
other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces, its
allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried
out or sustained by such non-nuclear-weapon State in association or
alliance with a nuclear weapons State.52

While this statement represents U.S. declaratory policy, it does not equate
to a binding international agreement although at least one expert argues to the
contrary. 3 Nor does it preclude the application of the belligerent reprisal
doctrine 4 in the event, for example, of the use by a treaty party of a nonnuclear but unlawful weapon of mass destruction. 5

47 Rosen, Id.

48 Id., at 47.
4'Lehman, supra note 25, at 542-546.
50

Rosen, supra note 46, at 57 (discussing claim of the former USSR that allowing transit was

incompatible with a NWFZ).
51Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,

729 U.N.T.S. 161.
52 Dep't of State, Statement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher, April 5, 1995.
5 See George Bunn, ExpandingNuclear Options: Is the US. NegatingIts Non-Use Pledges?,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May/June 1996, 7, 9-10.
See supranote 34.
5 ContraBunn supra note 53.
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B. Overflight
As with any military operation, judge advocates must be concerned
with overflight issues. Violations of national airspace are an infringement of
the overflown nation's sovereignty and may be opposed by force. Moreover,
nations asserting neutrality in a given conflict may feel obliged to take military
action against intruders in order to preserve their neutral status.56 Still, such
encroachments generally do not constitute acts of aggression within the
meaning of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Thus, overflight
violations - even as part of a military combat operation - do notper se sustain a
Nuremberg-like charge of aggression. 7
Ordinarily, of course, overflight permission will be sought. 8 For many
of the reasons suggested above, this effort may be complicated by the
international community's divergent views of the legality of nuclear weapons.
When nuclear operations are in support of a geographic combatant command,
it is the responsibility of that organization to ensure that the necessary
overflight permissions are obtained. The supported command also must secure
any overseas staging authorizations that a particular plan might require.
A further problem is presented by the overflight of ballistic missiles
because there is no universally accepted definition of the upward extent of
national sovereignty.59 There appears to be consensus, however, that systems
in orbit are beyond the territorial jurisdiction of particular states.6"
Accordingly, overflight of ballistic missiles, at least to the extent they are
traversing space at an altitude above the lowest point at which artificial
satellites can be placed in orbit without free-falling to earth, is more of a
political than legal issue. Legal advisors must, therefore, be well-versed in the
relevant political-military environment.
C. Civilian Control
U.S. nuclear forces operate under strict civilian control. Directing the
employment of U.S. nuclear weapons "requires the explicit decision of the
President."61 In this respect, American practice aligns with that of most nuclear
weapons states as historian Martin van Creveld observes:
" CompareGreen, supra note 25, at 260-261.
5 Ian Brownlie, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 362-363 (1963).
" It has been widely reported that cruise missiles flew through Iranian airspace during the
Gulf War without the explicit permission of the Iranian government. See Michael R.. Gordon
and General Bernard E. Trainor, THE GENERALS' WAR 116 (1995).
" AFP 110-31, supra note 13, at para. 2-1h.
60Id.

6"See Joint Pub 3-12 supra note 22, at 11-1. See generallyLehman supranote 25, at 501-503
(discussing command and control of U.S. nuclear forces).
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So far as we know, in every country that built the [nuclear] bomb the
existing chain of command was bypassed or modified in favor of direct
control by the head of state. Either the nuclear arsenal was entrusted to a
separate organization considered politically reliable.., or else technical
arrangements, known as Positive Action Links... were introduced so that
the military could not fire them on their own initiative even if they wanted
62

to.

Absent Presidential direction, U.S. military forces cannot use nuclear
weapons, even in self-defense. The Atomic Energy Act adds a further measure
of security by mandating civilian control over every aspect of nuclear weapons
production.63
V. PRACTICUM
Following a classified 1995 study by the USSTRATCOM legal staff, a
number of steps were taken to improve the incorporation of legal advice into
the nuclear planning process. These changes culminated in what CINCSTRAT
called an "unparalleled" level of integration of law into GLOBAL
GUARDIAN 97, the strategic nuclear exercise which took place in November
1996. A number of important lessons learned emerged from that exercise.
A. Operators must be aware of the specific obligations to
incorporate legal reviews into nuclear operations
planning on the same basis as conventional operations
planning.
DOD policy has never made any distinction between conventional and
nuclear operations when it required compliance with the law of war in the
conduct of military operations.'
The practical application of this policy,
however, was greatly facilitated by the new edition of a Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff instruction which specifically requires combatant command legal
65
advisors to review "pre-planned and adaptively planned strategic targets."
This review covers compliance with DOD policy, as well as domestic and
international law.
The February 1996 publication Joint Pub 3-12.166 was also helpful.
That document is replete with references to the applicability and importance of
62
63

Van Creveld supranote 3, at 305.

See e.g. 42 U.S.C §2121 etseq.
64 Dep't of Defense Directive 5100.7, DOD Law of War Program, July 10, 1979, at para.
E.l.a.
61 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD
Law of War Program,(August 1996), at para. 5c(4) (emphasis added).
' Supra note 27.
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LOAC and, accordingly, it served to orient planners and operators to the role of
legal advisors.
B. The special nature of nuclear operations requires
customized training for both operators and legal staffs.
Because of the many unique applications of international law in the
nuclear operations' context, USSTRATCOM's LOAC training was completely
revamped prior to GLOBAL GUARDIAN 97. A classified advanced
curriculum aimed at operators and others directly involved in nuclear
operations augmented the traditional LOAC briefing. Overall, 96% of
command personnel were trained prior to the exercise. Specialized training
was also provided to senior officers at USSTRATCOM's Task Force
commanders' conference in October 1996.
Like the operators, judge advocates and other legal personnel needed
additional training to support nuclear operations. Besides being trained as to
the special issues already mentioned, designated personnel also needed to
become familiar with the policy guidance applicable to nuclear strikes found in
such documents as National Security Directives, the Policy Guidance for
Nuclear Weapons Employment, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(Annex C), as well as theater-specific plans.67
To meet the requirement for specialized training for its legal personnel,
USSTRATCOM conducted in-house training sessions, sometimes with the
assistance of representatives of the Plans and Policy Directorate. In addition,
that Directorate produced a customized glossary of terms and acronyms
applicable to nuclear operations." USSTRATCOM judge advocates, in turn,
provided telephonic briefings (along with selected nuclear-operations oriented
legal materials) to their counterparts on the legal staff of the supported
geographic combatant command.
C. In order to provide timely advice, legal advisors must
be immediately available to planners and others
responsible for nuclear operations.
During the actual exercise, judge advocate and paralegal representation
was found on USSTRATCOM's Senior Battle Staff, the Mobile Consolidated
Command Center and, on a 24-hour basis, the Support Battle Staff. Judge
advocates were also inaugurated into meetings of the Nuclear Planning
67

For a general overview of nuclear war planning policies, see David Alan Rosenberg,

Nuclear War Planningin THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 160-190 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulnan, eds.,

1994).
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See supra note 30.
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Element (NPE).69 The NPE composition includes the weapons systems experts
who build from the bottom up the required technical information for an attack.
Constant interaction with these warfighters was especially critical as it
afforded the opportunity to provide planners with real-time advice for the
adaptive planning process.
Of particular note was USSTRATCOM's employment, for the first
time, of a reserve judge advocate to help man the Support Battle Staff. This
required a taxing months-long process to obtain the necessary security
clearances but proved essential to providing the necessary coverage. It once
again underlines how important it is for all operational lawyers, active and
reserve, to initiate the process to obtain elevated security clearances as early as
possible.
D. Effective legal support of theater nuclear operations
requires the involvement of the legal staffs of the
supported geographic CINC.
While USSTRATCOM legal advisors are primarily responsible for the
review of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP),70 meeting the legal
needs of theater support operations require a coordinated effort of
USSTRATCOM legal advisors and their counterparts on the staff of the
supported geographic commands.
During GLOBAL GUARDIAN 97, judge advocates were included in
the exercise cell of the supported geographic CINC. This development vastly
enhanced the flow of information concerning legal issues peculiar to nuclear
weapons. In particular, it helped to secure appropriate LOAC assessments and
ensured that the special issues that arise in the nuclear operations arena were
highlighted in a timely manner to the geographic command staff. The theater
CINC's legal staff was also a critical source of theater-specific information
required by USSTRATCOM's legal staff.

For a discussion of the mission and organization of the Senior Battle Staff, the Support
Battle Staff, and the Nuclear Planning Element see USSTRATCOM Directive 506-4, Crisis
Staffing Proceduresofthe United States Strategic Command Fixed Command Center, 1 March
69

1996.
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The Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) also has this responsibility.

CJCSI 5810.01 supra note 66, at para. 5a(2)(d). The SIOP is the "U.S. contingency plan for
strategic nuclear war. The SIOP provides the president and the national command authorities
with a variety of attack options, each with its own targets, timing, tactics, and force
requirements." Luttwak and Koehl, supra note 10, at 533-534.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that nuclear weapons, like other sophisticated
instrumentalities of modem war, are amenable to the law of armed conflict in
both a theoretical and practical sense. This by no means downplays the
horrific capability of these weapons; rather, it serves to remind us of the
awesome responsibilities legal advisors must bear. It is crucially important
that all military personnel involved with America's nuclear deterrent
understand that a structure exists that ensures that plans involving nuclear
weapons conform with the rule of law.
Of equal importance is explaining that there is, in fact, a direct
relationship between conformance with the rule of law and moral rectitude.
Professor Best spells this out: "It must never be forgotten that the law of war,
wherever it began at all, began mainly as a matter of religion and ethics ... It
began in ethics and it has kept one foot in ethics ever since."71 In short, where
society's law is observed, one may rightly contend that society's moral
standards are likewise respected.
Clearly, whether or not nuclear weapons are "morally indefensible" as
General Butler claims wholly depends upon the purpose for which they might
be employed and the manner of such employment. Having discussed the latter
we must consider the former - is there anything worth defending with a nuclear
weapon? What moral rights do we have? Professor Child offers this analysis
of the nuclear conundrum:
We have a right to protect ourselves and preserve our society and its
traditions. No matter the enormity of harm a potential aggressor might
heap upon us and the rest of the planet, that right is not expunged. It is
morally correct to put any such aggressor on notice. We know our rights
to defend ourselves and shall exercise them. Knowing what we believe
about our moral rights, any potential aggressor will know which course
prudence dictates. So in the end, this deeper moral understanding of our
72
position might help prevent the most colossal of all catastrophes.

In a very real sense, the issue General Butler raises goes to the more
fundamental question of the morality of war itself. For some, war is never
morally defensible; others live by the motto "live free or die."7 3 John Stuart
Mill captured the essence of this dichotomy in the following passage:
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and
degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth
a war, is worse .... A man who has nothing which he cares about more
than he does about his personal safety is a miserable creature who has no
7' Best, supra note 40, at 289.
71

Child, supranote 38, at 173.

71 "Live free or die" is motto of the State of New Hampshire.
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chance of being free, unless made and kept so by... better men than

himself.

74

Fortunately for the nation, there are yet such "better" men - and
women - manning the Nation's nuclear deterrent. It is their dedication that
serves as a clear warning to potential adversaries not to miscalculate the resolve
of the U.S. military. Should deterrence fail, our forces are - and must
continue to be - ready to immediately execute orders of the national
command authorities to employ nuclear weapons. Those that carry this gravest
of responsibilities are entitled to be secure in the knowledge that plans they
must execute honor the highest ideals of the country they have sworn to
defend. They deserve nothing less from their leaders.

7' John Stuart Mill in Dissertationsand Discussions, "The Contest in America" (1859), as
quoted in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (Microsoft Bookshelf ed. 1993)
(emphasis in original).
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